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Abstract—There are two inherent differences between generating adversarial images and 
adversarial texts, which causes difficulty in attacking textual machine learning systems. The first 
difficulty is the requiring of transforming a character-based data to a vector-based input, and the 
second one is the presenting of the perturbations. The perturbations in textual data show in the 
form of character changes that are easy to be detected by a human reader. Numerous methodologies 
have been proposed to find effective adversarial samples for text data in both white-box and black-
box settings but little attention has been paid on preserving the utility of adversarial results. This 
paper introduces a novel approach by leveraging an eye movement phenomenon while people 
reading, called saccade reading, to hide perturbations with a finely designed craft. Specifically, 
this paper provides a promising way of generating Chinese adversarial texts and hits 91.2% success 
rate in attacking positive data on Amazon AWS online sentiment analysis applications. 
Furthermore, a user study is conducted to show only 34.2% of perturbations are found in English 
samples from human perspectives. Also, 95% of the English adversarial texts and 88% of the 
Chinese adversarial texts assumed to be written by a real human writer. 
 
Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, with the universal usage of high computational devices, deep-learning neural 
networks (DNN) have been integrated into any amount of applications. These applications have 
widely used in daily life and helpt humans in different tasks, such as autonomous vehicles, machine 
translation, natural language processing, and even serious missions like medical image analysis. 
However, since the interpretability and intractability of neural network models, many prior studies 
have found out the vulnerability of these models and proposed effective attack strategies to make 
the artificial intelligence-based models return inferior results. Researchers, [1], first investigated 
that mixing some fine perturbations in an input image can interfere or even enforce the prediction 
in the way that the attacker wants. Also, they found out the perturbations only affect the machine 
learning models, while human observers are hard to perceive the man-made inputs and can still 
classify the data correctly. The modified image is named adversarial examples and the artificial 
intelligence communities have increased awareness and concerns for the adversarial examples 
before further promoting artificial intelligence applications. 
Followed the pioneering research, [1], many studies were proposed to generate adversarial 
attacking samples effectively and efficiently in computer vision scenario [2, 3]; however, due to 
the following two inherent differences between images and texts data, the methodology for 
generating pixels adversarial samples can not be directly applied on generating effective textual 
adversarial samples. The first fundamental difference is the input data for DNN models. The input 
of images is continuous pixels vectors, which is relatively easy to evaluate the changing distance 
between an original vector and a target vector. On the other hand, the input of texts is a character-
based file, which is discrete data. The discrete data requires additional transform from characters 
to vectors in vector space, then be available to use on DNN’s learning. For this inherent and natural 
reason, attackers need to put more strength on computing and finding adversarial texts than 
producing adversarial pictures. The second main difference between the two modalities is the 
utility of adversarial results. The minute pixel perturbations put in an image are indistinguishable 
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to human perception; hence the integrated images can successfully fool artificial intelligence 
models, while do not affect the judgment from humans. However, the perturbations in textual data 
occur as the form of characters changing, which is obvious and easy to be identified as typos, 
misspellings, and semantic or syntax errors by real readers. More concretely, it needs studies and 
contributions to optimize and preserve the utility of adversarial texts. 
Many studies have absorbed in overcoming the first aforementioned difference and successfully 
designed architectures that can generate textual adversarial samples and fool the text-based 
learning machine on both with-box testing [2, 4, 5] and black-box testing [7, 8, 12]. On the contrary, 
to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there has been less or no effort into conquering the 
second difference. Previous research turned to use perturbation measurements, such as edit 
distance measurement, Jaccard similarity coefficient, and semantic-preserving measurement, to 
measure the size of perturbations and constrain the modified proportion of textual data. However, 
these studies still focus on quantifying the changing and obtain the utility preserving through 
digital numbers but have not considered a real human perception and comprehension while reading 
yet. 
Furthermore, since the second difficulty that was mentioned before, all existing architectures 
can not be directly transformed onto other languages and successfully generate adversarial texts 
besides English. Not only the architectures but the perturbation measurements also need to be 
redesigned to correctly and fairly evaluate the perturbation distances; otherwise, the model will 
have the possibility to produce an adversarial text that has no meaning to a foriegner and cause 
failures on the offense. Consequently, due to tremendous linguistic differences (syntactic 
structures, grammatically validity, minimal meaningful unit, etc.) between language and language, 
research on generating adversarial text beside English has never attracted high attention. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Two circulated texts which are comprehensible to experienced English and Chinese readers. 
 
Approach. To advance previous research, optimize adversarial perturbations’ unperceivability, 
and also provide a novel design to successfully generate Chinese adversarial texts, this paper 
leverages an eye movement guidance that is named saccade reading [9, 10]. Previous research on 
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saccade reading style works on finding the preferred viewing location (PVL) of a word, which is 
an optimal position that a human reader usually fixates on and can correctly understand the word’s 
meaning. Then the duration of the next fixation will increase and turn out to not focus on the same 
word but do a saccade reading [9, 10]. Because of this psychological investigation of human eye 
movement, an interesting phenomenon happens when an experienced reader reads jumble articles. 
For example, a native or bilingual English or Chinese reader can still understand the meaning of 
the mixed texts in Fig. 1 without any trouble. Specifically, regardless of dramatical divergences 
between hieroglyphs such as Chinese and phonograms such as English, the saccade reading style 
exists in both languages and does not intervene comprehensibility. Section Ⅲ-B will describe the 
saccade phenomenon in detail, and Section Ⅲ-C and Ⅲ-D will introduce the implementation of 
refining English and Chinese perturbations respectively. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates the 
advantage and quality of saccade-based adversarial text via attacking online sentiment analysis 
services with high success rates in Section Ⅳ. Also, the researcher conducts a user study and 
shows the achievement of more natural and lower alert increasing adversary inputs comparing 
previous works. 
Contributions. The crux contributions of this paper are summarized as follow: 
 This paper is the first study that considers how the real-wold human’s reading and 
provides a perturbation generating algorithm which can generate more unperceivable 
and more natural adversarial texts comparing to previous works. Meanwhile, the general 
framework achieves high success attack rates against different state-of-the-art natural 
language processing applications. For instance, the success rate of attacking the Amazon 
AWS sentiment analysis system on negative data is 95.7% by perturbated only 4% of 
the words; 
 This paper provides a perturbation generating algorithm that has transferability. The 
algorithm and idea can be embedded in any other word-level based adversarial attack 
and return robust results; 
 This paper provides a promising way to generate Chinese adversarial texts and evaluates 
practicability, while none of the previous research has done before. Additionally, this 
paper successfully finds 91.2% of Chinese adversarial samples against Amazon AWS 
on the positive data; 
 This paper conducts surveys to verify the utility preserving of both English and Chinese 
adversarial samples and confirms the attacking samples do not have impacts on human 
reading, comprehending, and classifying. As shown in the user study, 95% of the English 
adversarial texts and 88% of the Chinese adversarial texts assumed to be written by a 
real human writer. 
The remainder of the paper is summarized as follows. Initially, this paper mentions the 
background knowledge that helps the reader to understand the goals and contributions of this paper 
in Section Ⅱ. In Section Ⅲ, the paper explains the saccade reading style in detail and introduces 
the English and Chinese generation algorithms. Furthermore, Section Ⅳ shows the attacking 
performances against real-world sentiment analysis models in a black-box setting for both 
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algorithms, and also includes the user study to present the quality of utility preserving in this 
paper’s methodology. Discussion in Section Ⅴ discusses the setting of the platform, potential 
defenses, and limitations and future works from paper’s results. Finally, this paper refers to related 
works in Section Ⅵ and concludes in Section Ⅶ. 
 
Ⅱ. BACKGROUND 
In this section, the researcher of this paper briefly introduces deep neural networks (DNN) 
machines, adversarial examples, adversarial attacks on textual DNN, word-level embedding 
models, and online sentiment analysis systems which is the target task used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of saccade-based texts in black-box testing. 
Deep Neural Networks (DNN). A DNN architecture is a multilayer artificial neural network 
that mimics the biological composition of neurons in human brains. The multiple input and output 
layers transmit the calculated probability of their activation functions, manipulate the weights and 
biases between individual neuron units, and learn and make predictions from training examples. 
Furthermore, DNNs can model linear and non-linear relationships and demonstrate strengths in 
different missions and domains, e.g., image, text, and audio data. 
Adversarial Examples. Since adversarial examples have been first exposed to artificial 
intelligence communities on attacking a computer vision DNN model [1], researchers are 
exploring and trying to explain the reason for the existence of the modified examples. Research 
[11] claims the primary cause is the inherently linear nature of DNN models. The vulnerability 
caused by the liner instinct of the activation functions makes it possible to be found enough 
variation that pushes a classification to the other side of a decision boundary. Additionally, when 
a small and sufficient value of variation is produced, it can be applied as a perturbation to be 
embedded in original input data, fool DNN models, and successfully produce a virtually 
imperceptible adversarial example. 
Adversarial Attacks on Textual DNN. The existing adversarial attacks on textual DNN can 
be categorized from different attacking attributes. White-box attacks are guided by gradient 
information from the model; on the contrary, black-box attacks do not require any information 
from the target model and usually are heuristic attacks. Targeted attacks are aiming to enforce a 
prediction to a certain label, while non-targeted attacks diverge the result of classification from the 
ground truth. Nevertheless, all textual adversarial attacks need a perturbation metric to quantify 
the perceptual similarity between an adversarial text and its original article to preserve the utility 
and readability. 
Word-level Embedding. While DNN models process text data, they require a word embedding 
to map the discrete word units to continuous vector values as an input. A well-constructed word 
embedding can transform most words to model-available tokens and return out-of-vocabulary for 
words not in the embedding dictionary. Furthermore, in an embedding vector space, the semantic 
vector distance can be utilized to measure and calculate the nearest neighbor vectors as the most 
semantically similar words. 
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Sentiment Analysis System. A sentiment analysis system is an artificial intelligence system 
that is widely applied to systematically extract and quantify humans’ emotions and subjective 
states. For a recommender system, sentiment analysis can help on mining the opinions of a 
customer and predict the preference toward a product or a band; for a fake news detection system, 
sentiment analysis is used to synthesize the affective responses from the reviewers as an important 
feature; for an internet monitoring tool that utilized by a marketing decision team, sentiment 
analysis system has been proved to be valuable on analyzing audiences mentalities, improving 
customers services and finding the insights of the marketing, because of the fact that people usually 
rely on the internet or social media to voice their throughs. 
 
Ⅲ. METHODOLOGY 
An eye movement guidance from word to word is a basic and natural way to understand the 
meaning of a sentence, and an experienced eye movement can decrease the time that needs to 
identify a word and increase the duration between fixations. This specific reading style is called 
the saccade reading style. While people unconsciously do saccade reading, people usually do not 
fixate on the same word while they already and confidently get the meaning of the word. As a 
result, the latter half of the word, which is the part that is ignored, will become a natural blind spot 
where can integrate perturbations and cause machine learning classifiers’ misclassifications. To 
adopt the blind spot caused by saccade reading style, the researcher exploit a developed and 
efficient word-level based attack architecture and propose three conditions that saccade reading 
happens. 
 
A. Word-level Architechure 
Reference [12] provides a strong framework, which can generate textual adversarial samples and 
is chosen due to the following reasons: (i) it is a word-level attack architecture which is suitable to 
embed the saccade-based generation function that is also in word-level, (ii) it is an efficient and 
effective framework to generate adversarial texts, (iii) it works under black-box settings and hence 
can be easily evaluated attack performances against state-of-the-art online natural language 
processing services, and (iv) it claims that it can produce various perturbations with utility, which 
can be used to measure and compare the indistinguishability with this paper’s saccade-based 
results. 
Formally, for an input text data x and a pre-trained learning model F(∙), an adversarial example 
x'  is defined as Eq. 1, which causes the model to misclassify. 
x' = x + η, F(x) = y, x ∈ X, 
F(x' ) ≠ y,                                                          (1) 
or F(x' ) = y' , y'  ≠ y  
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The textual sample space X is mapped by the classifier F: X→Y, while Y denotes the output classes. 
The goal of an adversarial attack is to find enough variations that can change the result from the 
ground truth y or to a targeted label y', and the purpose of this paper is to transform the variations 
to optimum and indistinguishable word bugs as practical applying perturbations η. 
Particularly, the architecture referred from reference [12] has a 2-step approach to find the word-
based bugs. Step (1): Sort Influential Sentences. Considering not all written sentences can find 
expressions from the writer, the first step is to send sentences respectively to the target 
classification model and sort the sentences in the order of the confidence values scored by the 
model. Step (2): Sort Influential Words. A scoring function presented by reference [8] is easy to 
calculate and used to measure the importance of each word in a sentence. The importance of a 
word is defined as the decreasing confidence score between the intact sentence and the sentence 
without the measured word. For example, a sentence s = (w1, w2, …, wi, …, wn) is composed of 
words wis where i represents the word in i
th position. Then the importance score of the word wi is 
defined as: 
Score(wi) = Fc(w1, w2, …, wi, …, wn) - Fc(w1, w2, …, wi-1, wi+1, …, wn)            (2) 
The word has a larger score considered to have more influence on sentiment classifying and is 
more important. In addition, the scoring function is able to reflect the impact of words without 
gradient guidance from the classification model. As a result, the architecture can evaluate words 
as features, and effectively and efficiently find enough vector variations to successfully attack 
textual deep learning models under the black-box scenario. 
After determining the priority of words in a sentence, we need to modify the words while 
preserving the utility at the same time. For a given word, this paper designs three types of 
modification regarding three attributes (details are described in Section Ⅲ-B) that saccade reading 
style has. Section Ⅲ-C introduces the detailed design of the English perturbation generation 
algorithm and Section Ⅲ-D introduces the detailed design of the Chinese algorithm. Consequently, 
the word-level architecture sorts the sentences and provides important words’ order to be mutated 
by the saccade-based bug generating algorithm; therefore, the framework shown in Fig. 2 can 
successfully and effectively generate adversarial texts that utilize the advantage found in saccade 
reading style and fool online deep learning applications. 
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Fig. 2. The framework and the new-designed perturbation generation algorithm of this paper. 
 
B. Saccade Reading Style 
A preferred viewing location (PVL) is the spot that human sight prefers to land in a word and 
recognize the word. PVL is mostly at the beginning or the middle of a word [9]; therefore, people 
usually can identify a word by only fixating the first half of it. To increase reading speed, people 
often unconsciously move the next fixation further to land on another word and do not tend to read 
the rest half of the already understood word carefully. This psychological reality of eye movement 
is frequently used by native language readers and named saccade reading style. For instance, when 
a Chinese reader read Chinese articles, a fixation not only can recognize the character on PVL but 
also two or three characters in front and behind the PVL [10]. More concretely, a fixation can get 
information around five to seven characters, which is enough to understand most of the Chinese 
words (shown as Fig. 3). The reason why saccade reading can ignore characters but still not affect 
understanding is introduced in the following paragraphs. 
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Fig. 3. While the first fixation is landing on “计”, where is the beginning of the word “计算机”, surrounding five 
characters are also unconsciously recognized in this fixation. Hence, the second fixation does not often focus on the 
same word but is moved onto the next word’s beginning. 
 
 
Fig. 4. The middle symbol changes meaning with different reading patterns. 
 
First and foremost, human-level comprehension is not based on understanding word by word 
but based on the whole cognition of the article. When people are familiar and full-experienced in 
a language, the cognitive process will change from pointing out and identifying each word to 
briefly scanning a sentence in a few fixations and sketching the sentence. The fixations at the 
beginning or center on some words will also provide information that is already enough to 
understand one or even two words. Hence, the comprehensive process change from discrete 
understanding to continuous understanding, which means a human reader does not need to 
separately read words one by one but understand word meaning according to word orders, context, 
etc. The whole-cognition understanding style will conduce to the habit of saccade reading and not 
be confused by the ignored characters. 
Secondly, besides the cognition habit, experiences and familiarity in a language also have a 
dramatic impact on comprehension. People will infer the continuous information based on the 
evidence and proof they have already known, which is the accumulated experience. In Fig. 4, 
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people who parse the picture in top-down processing will assume the word in the middle is 
numerical “13” based on the experience of the sequence of number, while the word will be 
considered as alphabetic “B” for people read in left-right order and make a decision via the 
experience of alphabet’s order. Furthermore, not only the texts in the same article have an impact, 
but the historical reading experience also makes people’s subconscious automatically guiding on 
arranging the fixated information to a have seen and familiar sentence. When a human reader only 
unconsciously fixates some easy understanding words in a sentence, the rest part will be filled with 
historical knowledge, have known cultures, have seen phrases, etc. Consequently, people who have 
well experienced in a language will confidently do saccade reading and correctly guess and put the 
meaning of the article together. 
Due to the reading style of the saccade, not all characters are carefully read. The ignored 
characters and words become a natural blind spot for humans. However, this psychological 
phenomenon does not occur in every language and not in every sentence. Even in the same 
language, saccade reading is not used on every PVL. The researcher of this paper organizes and 
summarizes three attributes of the conditions that saccade reading style will usually be used: 
 Square Characters. Unlike reading non-square characters constituting language, whose 
word segmentations are aided by spaces between words, square character-based 
language reader segment words highly depend on accumulated intuition. As a result, 
relatively depending on syntax and semantic experiences causes the reader relatively to 
do saccade while reading a language composed of square character units (e.g., Chinese 
and Korean). 
 Similar Structures. Continuous characters that have more similar structure complexity 
are usually more easily to be recognized and remembered together. That is to say, words 
that have structures similarity usually be understood in only one fixation (e.g., “人工” 
and “智能”). 
 High-frequency Phrases. Phrases more commonly appearing in daily life can build 
stronger experiences. Hence, the probability of a person does saccade reading is related 
to the familiarity of the phrase to that person. For example, a doctor is more often read 
in saccade than a normal person on medical nomenclature and terminology. 
Take Japanese for example, Japanese is also a square-character unit language, which relies on 
recognizing auxiliary words to segment words then understands meanings. However, Japanese 
consists of hiragana, katakana, and kanji, which the first two components have similar spacial 
structures and very different from kanjis’ structures. Accordingly, a Japanese will more possible 
to do saccade reading while reading Japanese words in the same kana-system or kanji-system, and 
comprehend information via experiences in Japanese. 
 
C. English Generation Algorithm 
English is a phonogram and non-square character-based language, and segmentation in English is 
helpt by spaces between words. Hence, saccade reading between word and word does not happen 
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while people reading in English. However, a similar psychological reading style occurs in contrast. 
The long length in English words also causes human PVL landing at the beginning or center of a 
word and recognize the word, but the next fixation still needs to focus on the next word. Meanwhile, 
the rest characters of the former word will be automatically considered in the correct sequence and 
unconsciously ignored. That is to say, the blind spot that can be used to merge perturbation does 
not locate between word and word but between character and character in the same word’s second 
half part. 
Although English does not consist of Square Characters, a similar psychological reading style 
causes an ignored blind spot in the latter half of a word. To remain the same first and last character 
in a word and control the number of changeable characters, an intact word will be separated into 
three arrays: head_array, modified_array, and tail_array. The tail_array stores the last character, 
the modified_array stores at most five reciprocal characters but not the first character, and the 
head_array stores the rest characters of the word. To preserve the similarity with the original word, 
only characters in the modified_array will be modified.  
Considering the Similar Structures between characters, a cost counting function, as shown in 
Algorithm 1, is introduced to define and calculate the cost of a swapping operation. Characters 
that have similar spatial structures are classified in the same categories and assumed to have 
smaller impacts on swapping them than swapping the characters in different categories. For 
example, swapping character “a” and “t” will have one cost, while swapping “a” and “e” will cost 
zero. Furthermore, only swapping adjacent characters at most two times is allowed. The candidate 
bug list built based on saccade reading will sort the bugs based on the swapping times, then the 
cost of the swapping operations, and lastly the positions of the swapping. A candidate bug list 
example is shown in Fig. 5.  
Moreover, it is no question of evaluating and measuring the High-frequency Phrases for each 
individual since they differ in person’s experiences, and there is not a universal corpus library that 
gathered English phrases with their appearing frequency in daily life. On the other hand, for an 
input word in Saccade_bug function (line 1 and 4 in Algorithm 2), the function will first generate 
a bug list considering the cost, then merge the bug in the saccade-based bug list one by one with 
the original sentence, and return only one saccade-bug as type Sac’s bug who decreases the 
confidence value from the original text the most. More explanations and examples of type Sac will 
be shown in Section Ⅳ. 
The whole English saccade-based generation algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. With an 
influential word sorted by architecture described in Section Ⅲ-A, the English generation function 
adds other five words who are the most semantically and syntactically similar with the original 
word to type Sub-W’s bugs (line 2); furthermore, the saccade-bugs of the five similar word are 
also seen as a hybrid and new type of bugs, type Sub-W-Sac. There will have eleven candidate 
bugs in three types for an influential word. Lastly, the function will select the one in the eleven 
which decreases the confidence value between the original text and mutated text the most as a 
practically applied perturbation (line 10).  
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Fig. 5. The word who has a less swapping time, then a smaller cost, and then a latter swapping position has a higher 
priority in the saccade-based bug list. 
 
Algorithm 1 Cost counting function 
  1:  function cost(c1, c2) 
  2:    cate_1 = ["b", "d", "f", "h", "k", "l", "t"];                           
  3:    cate_2 = ["g", "j", "p", "q", "y"]; 
  4:    cate_3 = ["a", "c", "e", "i", "m", "n", "o", "r", "s", 
  5:                  "u", "v", "w", "x", "z"]; 
  6:    cate_4 = ["A", "B", ..., "Z"]; 
  7:    if c1’s category != c2’s category then 
  8:        return 1;  
  9:    else  
10:       return 0; 
11:  end function 
 12 
 
 
Algorithm 2 English generation algorithm 
Input: original text x, target word w, classifier F (∙) 
Output: perturbation η 
  1:  Bug_list.Add(Saccade_bug(w)); 
  2:  for bug in 5_most_similar(w) do 
  3:    Bug_list.Add(bug);         
  4:    Bug_list.Add(Saccade_bug(bug));  
  5:  end for 
  6:  for Bug in Bug_list do 
  7:    x' = x.Swap_word(w, Bug);  
  8:    confdecrease_list.Add(F(x) - F(x'));      
  9:  end for 
10:  η = Max(confdecrease_list)’s bug; 
11:  return η 
 
D. Chinese Generation Algorithm 
Chinese is a hieroglyph and square character-based language, and segmentation in Chinese is done 
according to readers’ subjective reading experiences. Hence, saccade reading between word and 
word does often occur during reading in Chinese. However, since Chinese is a symbolic language, 
each character has a representative meaning and there are no spaces in sentences. Chinese 
sentences are generally visually shorter than English sentences in the same meanings. That is to 
say, the blind spot between word and word is lesser in Chinese sentences and modified positions 
are relatively perceptible. It needs a fine craft to control modified positions and times and embed 
perturbations with the legitimate original text. 
Chinese is comprised of Square Characters; therefore, the ignored blind spot caused by saccade 
reading locates in the second half of a fixation, where is the latter part of a target word. Swapping 
characters between words will often make both words meaningless at the same time and break 
them into an independent characters’ sequence. However, when people do saccade reading, the 
historical reading experience and subconscious will automatically reorder the fixated characters to 
a have seen and familiar sentence. Overall, the confusing and syntax error character orders will be 
formed back to original and acceptable words for Chinese readers. Particularly, the swapping 
operation, Swap_wordschar (line 12 and 17 in Algorithm 3), in Chinese generation function is 
either swapping the last character of the target word with the first character of the next word or 
swapping the first character of the target word with the last character of the previous word. A 
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certain word’s characters are still in the same relative order in the sentence. Unlike English 
adversarial texts that swapping characters in the same word, reversing characters in Chinese words 
will probably direct to another existing word and cause fixations can not correctly land at the 
beginning of the original target word. 
Considering the Similar Structures in Chinese, the generation algorithm of Chinese has an array, 
lock_array , which is used to record the position of unmodifiable characters. For millions of 
characters in Chinese, unfortunately, there is not a library that organizes information on the spatial 
features of Chinese characters. Currently, it has difficulty in measuring and comparing the spatial 
structures of two characters and then decides whether or not to swap these two characters, since 
changing two extremely dissimilar characters is relatively obvious and easy to be perceived as an 
unnatural text by a human reader. Instead, the lock_array collects the position of all punctuations 
and the words that have already modified one time. Words in the lock_array are forbidden to be 
mutated and swapped again. 
Moreover, it is unadaptable to measure and qualify High-frequency Phrases, since they differ 
from person to person. Alternatively, this paper assumes a principle that a longer phrase has a 
higher frequency of appearing to everyone. For example, 4-characters idioms are often used in 
daily life and considered as one word to most natural language processing models; hence, words 
have long lengths are often segmented into a frequently showing up pattern and well known by 
every Chinese. That is to say, the swapping in a long word is comparatively imperceptible and will 
easily be reordered back to known proverbs and phrases. As a result, for a target word whose 
anterior word and posterior word are both not in the lock_array, the swapping is operated on the 
word who has the longer word length. If they have the same word length, the algorithm will swap 
the last character of the target word and the first character of the posterior word (line 2-7 in 
Algorithm 3).  
The whole Chinese saccade-based generation algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3. With an 
influential word sorted by architecture described in Section Ⅲ-A, the Chinese generation function 
first decides the swapping position considering the lock_array and the word lengths. Directly 
swapping one character of the influential word with one character of the word at the swapping 
position is designed as type Sac’s bug (line 12); furthermore, to increase the richness and diversity 
of the attacking bugs, the algorithm also takes the top-5 nearest neighbors searched in the Chinese 
embedding space as type Sub-W’s and the saccade-based swapping of the neighbor words as 
candidate type Sub-W-Sac’s bugs (line 15 and 17). Calculating the difference between the original 
text and eleven infected text, the algorithm will return the perturbation that decreases confidence 
value the most and updated lock_array for the next influential word in the same sentence. 
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Algorithm 3 Chinese generation algorithm 
Input: original text x, target word wi is the i
th word in 
      the sentence, classifier F(∙), word_len[length of  
      words], lock_array[punctuation and modified  
      words’position] 
Output: perturbation η, updated lock_array[∙] 
  1:  if i-1 and i+1 not in lock_array then 
  2:    if word_len[i-1] == word_len[i+1] then 
  3:      swapposition= i+1; 
  4:    else 
  5:      swapposition= Larger(word_len[i-1],  
  6:                               word_len[i+1])’s position;   
  7:    end if 
  8:  else 
  9:    swapposition= (i-1 or i+1) who is not in lock_array; 
10:  end if 
11:  wswap= word in swapposition; 
12:  x'' = x.Swap_wordschar(wi, wswap);  
13:  confdecrease_list.Add(F(x) - F(x'')); 
14:  for bug in 5_most_similar(wi) do 
15:    x' = x.Swap_word(wi, bug);       
16:    confdecrease_list.Add(F(x) - F(x')); 
17:    x'' = x'.Swap_wordschar(bug, wswap); 
18:    confdecrease_list.Add(F(x) - F(x'')); 
19:  end for 
20:  η = Max(confdecrease_list)’s bug; 
21:  lock_array.Add(i, swapposition);  
22:  return η, lock_array[∙]    
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Ⅳ. RESULTS 
In this section, the paper studies the particular performances of the English generation function 
against real-world sentiment analysis applications in the black-box setting, presents the 
achievements of the Chinese generation function, and compares the quality and utility of 
adversarial results with previous work, TextBugger [12]. 
 
A. Experimental Setup 
All experiments run on an HCP server machine with 10 Core Intel Xeon E5-2660 v3 2.6GHz 
Processor and 128 GB memory, and the operating system is Ubunto 20.04 LTS. The segmentation 
of English words is helped by the spaCy library1, and the pre-trained 300-dimension 840 billion 
tokens embedding model, GloVe [15], is utilized to find the five most semantic similarity words 
for targeted English words. On the other hand, since the performances of current state-of-the-art 
application programming interfaces (API) on Chinese segmentation are not much difference, the 
paper uses Baidu platform’s API to segment Chinese words, and utilizes fastText2, an open-source 
library that has distributed word vectors for Chinese, to find the top-5 semantically similar words 
for targeted Chinese words. 
Datasets. This paper studies the attack performances of English adversarial examples on IMDB 
movie reviews [13]. This benchmark dataset contains 50,000 positive and negative movie reviews 
and is suitable for binary sentiment classification. This paper randomly chooses 1,200 texts (half 
of them are positive samples and half of them are negative samples) whose word number is limited 
below 200 words; since a 200-words comment is enough for extracting reviewers’ opinion, while 
longer text will have more indistinct and ambiguous expressions and also cause too long 
perturbations generating time. For the Chinese sentiment task, this paper selects ChnSentiCorp 
[14]. This dataset is a publicly available Chinese sentiment corpus of different domains: education, 
movie, and hotel. This paper randomly extracts 600 positive and 600 negative texts of hotel 
reviews which length of the text is smaller than 200 characters. 
Target Models. For the English sentiment task, this paper shows the black-box attack 
performances on Google Cloud Natural Language, IBM Cloud Waston Natural Language 
Understanding, and Amazon AWS Comprehend. For the Chinese sentiment task, this paper 
examines the framework on Google Cloud Natural Language, Baidu AI Cloud’s sentiment analysis 
(情感倾向分析), and Amazon AWS Comprehend platforms. 
Evaluation Metrics. Previous works, including TextBugger [12], use different evaluation 
metrics to measure the size of perturbations or the difference between innocent text and adversarial 
text so that they can constrain the perturbations and evaluate the effectiveness of an attacking 
strategy. In this paper, a text-domain similarity function, S(x, x'), captures the similarity between 
                                                          
1 http://spacy.io 
2 https://fasttext.cc 
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a clean text x and its adversarial text x'. While remains imperceptibility when S(x, x') ≥ ε (ε is a set 
value to control the textual similarity with the original text) and the prediction from the target 
model differs from the ground truth (e.i., F( x') ≠ y), an adversarial text is successfully found. If it 
does not, repeats the steps in the framework shown in Fig. 2 and replace another word with its 
perturbation until the prediction label changed, or return failing to generate (while S(x, x') < ε), 
which means it can not find an attacking text and preserve the utility in the same time. Although 
the imperceptibility of saccade-based bugs can not be reasonably quantified and fairly constrained 
by current any evaluation metrics, to compare the utility preserving ability with TextBugger’s 
results, this paper refers and continue uses the semantic preserving measurement settings in 
TextBugger to compute the cosine similarity value and set the threshold ε to 0.8 for the English 
saccade-based generation frameworks. On the other hand, the swapping operation in Chinese 
preserves readability to humans but contrary becomes semantic and syntax errors to models. Hence, 
instead of calculating similarity in word-vector space, this paper chooses the edit-based 
Levenshtein distance to measure the changes of characters in strings and sets the threshold ε to 0.7 
for the Chinese saccade-based frameworks to make a balance between the success rate and the 
indistinguishability of attacks. 
This paper designs three kinds of bugs for every target word: (1) Sac: the swapped perturbation 
of the original word based on the saccade reading style; especially, English Sac is swapping 
characters in the same word and Chinese Sac is swapping one character with another character in 
the other word, (2) Sub-W: the substitute words are the five most semantic similar words that 
recommended by the GloVe embedding model for English or the fastText library for Chinese, and 
(3) Sub-W-Sac: bugs that applied saccade-based swapping operation on the substitute words. All 
11 candidate bugs will individually be merged with the original text and the one that decreases the 
confidence value in the groud truth’s label the most will be considered as the practical perturbation. 
The English generation algorithm in this paper is named Saccade and the Chinese algorithm is 
named ChSaccade respectively in further experimental discussions. Examples of adversarial texts 
and three types of bugs are shown in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 6.  An English and a Chinese adversarial example and their perturbations’ type respectively generated by 
Saccade and ChSaccade. 
 
B. English Sentiment Models Attack Evaluation 
The main results of attacking different online platforms on IMDB dataset in the black-box 
setting are summarized in Tables Ⅰ and Ⅱ. The original accuracy columns in Table Ⅰ represent the 
model classifying accuracy on the original data by each platform. Additionally, the sentiment score 
of Google Cloud and IBM Waston is [-1, 1], while negative score represents negative emotion and 
positive score represents positive emotion; moreover, Amazon AWS has respective sentiment 
score for each category and the category that has the largest score value will be predicted as the 
sentiment of the input text. However, after further investigation, the researcher finds out there is 
an interval in Google Cloud platform’s sentiment score that represents neutral or mixed sentiment 
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documents, which indicate the input text has mixed emotion sentences that offset the impacts from 
each other. The researcher assumes the interval is [0, 0.1] which is a sectional boundary between 
positive and negative sentiment scores. As a result, setting static zero as the flipping point brings 
about the poor performance of both TextBugger and Saccade methods on misleading positive data 
to negative predictions, as shown in the left side first row of Table Ⅰ. On the contrary, both methods 
achieve a high success rate on attacking IBM Waston and Amazon AWS. While TextBugger using 
easily perceived bugs, Saccade makes a good trade-off between the success rate and the 
imperceptibility of bugs and only decreases less than a 3% success rate in negative data on the 
Amazon AWS platform. Furthermore, we can observe that positive texts are harder to be 
manipulated to texts that have a negative label. All results in Table Ⅰ show that the success rates of 
generating adversarial samples for negative data are higher than generating for positive data on all 
platforms by both of the methods. The comparison shown in Table Ⅱ can be seen that the 
adversarial texts generated by Saccade are more similar to the original texts. Additionally, since 
the main time costing of the methodologies is related to the response time from the API servers, 
and the response time is related to the location where the experiments are carried out, the expedient 
way of evaluating the time costing is to record the request times for generating an attacking text. 
From the last row of Table Ⅱ, we can see that even Saccade perturbating fewer words in a text, it 
needs more requesting times than TextBugger needed. That is to say, Saccade modifies a few 
words but each word spends more time on testing various bugs by abundantly communicating with 
a service server. 
 
TABLE Ⅰ. Results of Attacking Online English Sentiment Analysis Models. 
Platform 
Positive Data Negative Data 
Original 
Accuracy 
TextBugger 
Success Rate 
Saccade 
Success Rate 
Original 
Accuracy 
TextBugger 
Success Rate 
Saccade 
Success Rate 
Google Cloud 94.1% 16.3% 0.0% 82.6% 52.2% 78.9% 
IBM Waston 83.9% 89.9% 86.8% 89.8% 95.5% 90.8% 
Amazon AWS 86.3% 95.3% 80.4% 73.8% 97.5% 95.7% 
 
TABLE Ⅱ. Details of Adversarial Texts. 
 TextBugger Saccade 
Average Length 144.9 142.8 
Similarity 0.961 0.976 
Perturbated Words 5.24% 4.00% 
Request Times 179.5 240.4 
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Fig. 7. The cumulative distribution in different semantic similarity on all platforms. 
 
The semantic similarity metric sampling all unknow words with uniform distribution can not 
fairly measure the strength of Saccade’s bugs. However, from the utility analysis in Fig. 7, we can 
still see that Saccade’s adversarial texts are more similar to the original texts in the word vector 
space. 
This paper also studies the performances of Saccade on different lengths of text. From Fig. 8(a), 
we can observe that it is harder to find adversarial texts for short-length text on IBM Waston, and 
the success rates of attacking both platforms rise with the increasing of the words in texts. Fig. 8(b) 
and 8(c) show that IBM Waston is stronger against adversarial attacks than Amazon AWS. IBM 
Waston needs to edit more words do decrease lesser confidence value for a longer text. On the 
other hand, the average edited words required for a 200-words text is less than five on the Amazon 
AWS platform. Furthermore, the average request times are linearly growing in Fig. 8(d), which 
indicates the time complexity of the Saccade algorithm is linear time. 
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(a)                                                                                     (b) 
 
(c)                                                                                      (d) 
Fig 8. The impact of text length on attacking Amazon AWS and IBM Waston by Saccade. The decreasing value in 
sub-figure (b) indicates the difference between the original text’s confidence score and the adversarial text’s 
confidence score in the same label. For example, the original text is classified as positive with 0.8 confidence, while 
the adversarial text is classified as negative with 0.6 confidence and still has 0.2 confidence in positive. Then the 
decreasing value is 0.8-0.2=0.6. 
 
Transferability studies the property of the adversarial texts generated from one platform to attack 
the other platform. Usually, the transferability is measured on transferring the white-box attacking 
result to a black-box setting attack, but the negative data’s adversarial texts generated from IBM 
Waston can hit 39.4% in the success rate on attacking Amazon AWS, as shown in Table Ⅲ. 
Moreover, the proportion of used bugs’ types is shown in Fig. 9. The main type of used bugs on 
Amazon AWS is Sub-W-Sac, while the Sac bugs’ proportion increases on IBM Waston. That is to 
say, swapping characters in English words can effectively cause sentiment classifying models’ 
confusing. 
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TABLE Ⅲ. Transferability on Platforms. 
 From IBM Waston to Amazon AWS From Amazon AWS to IBM Waston 
Original Sentiment Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Success Rate 17.0% 39.4% 28.3% 8.7% 
 
 
Fig. 9. The bug distribution of Saccade’s adversarial texts on different platforms. 
 
C. Chinese Sentiment Models Attack Evaluation 
This sub-section demonstrates the main performance of attacking different online Chinese 
sentiment analysis API by ChnSentiCorp in a black-box setting. The sentiment scores of Google 
Cloud and Amazon AWS are determined in the same way as English sentiment services, and Baidu 
AI directly returns a confidence score while it predicts a category. In addition, the mixed files 
interval is inferred to [0.0, 0.1] in the Google Cloud platform, and setting a static changing point 
as zero causes positive mutated texts are harder to cause disagree with the model, and negative 
adversarial texts are easier to cause misclassified. The assumption is proved in the first row of 
Table Ⅳ. In contrast, the attacking success rate of Amazon AWS on the positive dataset can 
achieve 91.2%,  and the negative dataset’s success rate is 85.6%. For the reason that most of the 
negative characters in Chinese still retain frustrated and negative meanings despite changing the 
position in the sentence or becoming one individual character. For example, “不” and ”烂”. This 
characteristic of Chinese causes the limitation of implementing ChSaccade, and also causes 
significant success rate dropping in the Baidu AI task as shown in the second row of Table Ⅳ. 
Particularly, the similarity of ChSaccade is calculated on edited distance (edited characters) 
divided by the total character numbers in the original text. We can see from Table Ⅳ that the 
success adversarial texts generated on Google Cloud have the highest similarity. Also, the selected 
Amazon AWS server is in the same region with the experimental server, so much so that the 
 22 
 
average time for generating Chinese adversarial texts on Amazon AWS is the shortest. As a result, 
It is more suitable to record and compare the request times that request the responses from the 
service server for generating an adversarial text. 
 
TABLE Ⅳ. Results of Attacking Online Chinese Sentiment Analysis Models. 
Platform 
Positive Data Negative Data 
Acc. 
Success 
Rate 
Similarity 
Time 
(s) 
Acc. 
Success 
Rate 
Similarity 
Time 
(s) 
Google Cloud 84.1% 2.8% 0.919 59.0 84.9% 71.5% 0.947 46.6 
Baidu AI 78.4% 73.3% 0.795 43.6 96.9% 44.9% 0.781 53.2 
Amazon AWS 61.3% 91.2% 0.886 17.3 84.7% 85.6% 0.875 23.1 
Acc. stands for the original accuracy on the platforms. 
 
 
Fig. 10. The cumulative distribution in different similarity on all platforms. 
 
Fig. 10 shows that the Chinese adversarial text still preserves good utility, but lack of Google 
Cloud platform’s adversarial texts that have the highest similarity. 
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                                                    (a)                                                                                       (b) 
 
                                                    (c)                                                                                      (d) 
Fig. 11. The impact of text length on attacking Amazon AWS and IBM Waston by ChSaccade. While the x-axis in 
Fig. 8 is the smallest meaningful unit that is a word in English, Chinese adversarial texts can be evaluated by characters 
for a more precise and suitable evaluation scale. 
 
The impact of character numbers on the ChSaccade method is shown in Fig. 11. ChSaccade 
performs well on Amazon AWS despite the growth of text length, while the success rate on Baidu 
AI in Fig. 11(a) drops to 40% on texts that have 200 characters. From the sub-figure (b) and (c) in 
Fig. 11, we can observe that editing more characters does increase the decreasing value on Baidu 
AI but not enough to tilt the balance toward the other label. For example, the original negative text 
has 0.9 sentiment score on prediction to negative and the adversarial attack method can subtract 
0.8 score value, then the sentiment score becomes 0.1. However the initial sentiment score on the 
positive label is only 0.05; that is to say, the negative sentiment value is still larger than the positive 
value. Baidu AI is really confident in classifying to one sentiment and gives few assurances on 
other sentiment categories. Furthermore, Fig. 11(d) indicates the linear time complexity of the 
ChSaccade algorithm. 
In Table Ⅴ, adversarial results form Baidu AI achieve more than 50% of success rate on 
attacking the Amazon AWS platform despite positive or negative data. That is to say, the 
adversarial texts generated from Baidu AI have stronger strength and higher quality of transferring. 
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According to Fig. 12, type Sac is barely implemented, and type Sub-W and Sub-W-Sac almost 
equally share the rest proportion on Amazon AWS and Baidu AI platforms. Consequently, Chinese 
sentiment analysis models are vulnerable to substituting semantic and syntactic similar words. 
 
TABLE Ⅴ. Transferability on Platforms. 
 From Baidu AI to Amazon AWS From Amazon AWS to Baidu AI 
Original Sentiment Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Success Rate 58.3% 50.4% 17.7% 7.1% 
 
 
Fig. 12. The bug distribution of ChSaccade’s adversarial texts on different platforms. 
 
D. User Study 
One of the main advantages of applying the saccade-based algorithm is it can generate high utility 
preserving and low virtually perceptible perturbations composing adversarial examples. To 
evaluate the quality of saccade-based adversarial examples, this paper conducts surveys on human 
readers and presents the unquantifiable pluses of Saccade and ChSaccade models through user 
studies introduced in this section. 
The researcher asks the participants to read each experimental text only once and intuitively 
answer three perceptual relating questions in the survey: 
 Label the sentiment of the article (i.e., positive or negative). 
 Guess if the article is written by a human.  
 Mark suspicious words and sentences (typo, strange expression, etc.). 
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In addition, to erase the bias and radical opinion and control the costing time for each survey, the 
last question (marking task) is independent and separated into its own survey. There are 20 texts 
in a survey and the texts in the same group are not arranged in the same survey. The group of texts 
contains an original text and the successful adversarial texts of the original text made by 
TextBugger and Saccade (for Chinese, it is Chsaccade). Moreover, the surveys are anonymous and 
do not collect names or any personally identifying information from participants. Specifically, the 
surveys investigate the language proficiency of the participants because of the fact that the saccade 
reading is more likely to happen on people who have certain familiarity in the language, and it can 
also be used to filter out random and malignant responses. 
The English surveys recruit participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), while Chinese 
participants are recruited on Wenjuanxing3, which is a crowdsourcing service that includes more 
native Chinese speakers than Amazon MTurk. The researcher samples out 60 groups of English 
texts (30 positive groups and 30 negative groups) and 60 groups of Chinese texts (30 positive and 
30 negative groups). Finally, there were 436 legitimate responses on English surveys and 95 
legitimate responses on Chinese surveys, and there were at least nine participants read and 
evaluated each English text and at least seven participants on every Chinese text. 
 
TABLE Ⅵ. Results of English User Study. 
 TextBugger Saccade 
Correctly Classified Texts 60 (100%) 60 (100%) 
Perturbations 616 448 
Found Perturbations 64.0% 34.2% 
Considered Natural Texts 16 (26.7%) 57 (95%) 
Correctly Classified Texts: the adversarial texts that classified as the ground truth by participants; Perturbations: total 
number of bugs put in adversarial texts; Found Perturbations: the rate of bugs that pointed out by participants; 
Considered Natural Texts: the adversarial texts that considered written by human writers. 
 
TABLE Ⅶ. Found Bugs in Saccade’s Texts 
 Sac Sub-W Sub-W-Sac 
Found Proportion 45.6% 22.2% 42.2% 
 
1. English User Study: In an English text, a perturbation is a word-level bug which is one 
type of Sac, Sub-W, and Sub-W-Sac. From Table Ⅵ, we can observe that all adversarial texts from 
both methods can be classified back to the ground truth by the participants; that is to say, all 
adversarial texts are effectively diverging human opinions from computer models’ predictions. 
                                                          
3 https://www.wjx.cn 
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Furthermore, the found perturbations rate of TextBugger is almost twice times the number of the 
Saccade method, as shown in the third row in Table Ⅵ. The researcher noticed that even a sentence 
is over-modified to a chaos and syntax error sentence, if the other sentences in the article remain 
valid and plausible, the article is still classified as a normal and natural text that written by a real-
world writer. For this reason, the holistic perspective and sketchy impression of the whole article 
is relatively important. Especially, the character-level modifications used in TextBugger, e.g., 
inserting a spacebar, deleting a letter and substituting a character (o to 0, a to @, etc.), are able to 
let a reader recognizes the word but the word actually becomes really suspicious and becomes an 
obvious error that does not belong to an innocent and natural English article. On the other hand, 
Sac, Sub-W, and Sub-W-Sac are comparatively suitable and optimal bug mutating crafts that 
generate virtually imperceptible and utility preserving adversarial samples. As a result, almost all 
Saccade produced texts are assumed written by human writers. Table Ⅶ shows the proportion of 
each type of bugs that be found out. With the bug distribution information in Fig. 9, Sub-W is 
mainly used but only 22.2% of them seem as suspicious words. Particularly, an individual Sub-W 
perturbation is almost not found, while a marked strange expression sentence often carries out 
multiple and numerous Sub-W and Sub-W-Sac perturbations at one time. 
 
TABLE Ⅷ. Results of Chinese User Study. 
 ChSaccade 
Correctly Classified Texts 58 (96.7%) 
Perturbations 241 
Found Perturbations 66.4% 
Considered Natural Texts 53 (88.3%) 
 
TABLE Ⅸ. Found Bugs in ChSaccade’s Texts 
 Sac Sub-W Sub-W-Sac 
Found Proportion 45.6% 22.2% 42.2% 
 
2. Chinese User Study: In a Chinese text, a perturbation is a word-level bug which is one type 
of Sac, Sub-W, and Sub-W-Sac. Specifically, the researcher noticed that the top-5 nearest word 
vectors captured by fastText library include traditional Chinese characters despite all target words 
are written in simplified Chinese characters. Since these traditional characters constituting bugs 
also selected as effective and implemented perturbations, the surveys also investigate the 
participants’ familiarity in traditional Chinese. For 72% of the participants confidently think 
themselves can understand more than 70% traditional characters, selecting traditional character-
based bugs does not influence comprehension of the adversarial articles. As shown in Table Ⅷ, 
58 adversarial texts can successfully attack the learning model while do not intervene in human 
judgments. Although 66.4% of the perturbations were founded, there were 53 texts assumed to be 
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produced by human writers. Specifically, the rest of the two wrongly classified texts and seven 
unnatural texts are all positive texts, which is considered that the negative Chinese adversarial texts 
have higher quality. Referring to the result in Table Ⅳ, Chinese negative opinions are more 
difficult to reverse and respectively remain more sentiment and naturalness on Chinese adversarial 
samples. From Table Ⅸ, we can observe that the proportion of each type of bug is much higher 
than the number in Table Ⅶ that is the proportion of English bugs. Accordingly, even leveraging 
the psychological phenomenon to integrate and hide perturbations in Chinese texts, the 
concealability of perturbations in English adversarial samples is higher. 
 
Ⅴ. DISCUSSION 
A. Different Platform Setting 
In Section Ⅳ-B and Ⅳ-C, the researcher assumed a neutral and mixed emotion files’ interval in 
[0, 0.1] that causes pessimistic results on transforming a positive data to a negative-predicted 
adversarial text on Google Cloud sentiment analysis service. The mixed emotion files are 
documents that have multiple and plural sentiment sentences, which is not labeled in negative nor 
positive files. In this section, the researcher takes the mixed files as the third category, sets 
changing the sentiment score less than 0.1 is a successful generating for positive data, and presents 
the new achievement from the setting. 
 
TABLE Ⅹ. Results of Saccade on Google Cloud. 
Platform 
Positive Data Negative Data 
Acc. 
Success 
Rate 
Similarity 
Perturbated 
Words 
Acc. 
Success 
Rate 
Similarity 
Perturbated 
Words 
Google 
Cloud 
81.5% 67.7% 0.988 1.86% 82.6% 79.8% 0.991 1.63% 
 
TABLE Ⅺ. Results of ChSaccade on Google Cloud. 
Platform 
Positive Data Negative Data 
Acc. 
Success 
Rate 
Similarity 
Perturbated 
Characters 
Acc. 
Success 
Rate 
Similarity 
Perturbated 
Characters 
Google 
Cloud 
76.4% 62.6% 0.913 8.68% 84.9% 73.3% 0.946 5.40% 
 
Comparing Table Ⅹ and Table Ⅰ, we can see that considering the [0, 0.1] interval as the third 
category leads to the higher success rate of positive data and contains a really high-level similarity 
for English adversarial texts. However, the original accuracy of Google Cloud is dropped from 
94.1% to 81.5%, which means there are some impure positive data that have mixed emotional 
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sentences and expressions at the same time. TABLE Ⅺ also shows that the success rate of 
generating Chinese adversarial texts for positive data is significantly risen from 2.8% to 62.6%, as 
shown in Table Ⅳ. The significant improvement in the result while preserving high utility presents 
the new setting is more suitable and reasonable on evaluating performances of Saccade and 
ChSaccade methods. However, as the researcher suggested in Section Ⅳ-C that the negative data 
have the stronger characteristic against manipulating strategies, the negative data’s success rate is 
more likely to be lower than that in the positive data. Consequently, the interval of Google Cloud 
has possible to be even larger, for instance, [0, 0.15], and the results of Saccade and ChSaccade 
models will be adjusted with different settings. 
 
B. Potential Defenses 
Spelling Checker and Language Model. Using a context-sensitive spelling checker can 
potentially contrast a misspelled word to a recognized word in the dictionary and automatically 
reflect the correct spelling word. Additionally, using a language model is capable to measure the 
existing probability between different words and phrases. For example, two phrases: "a red apple" 
and "a blue apple". Although they are syntactically similar, the appearing possibility of “a red 
apple” in sentences is much higher than “a blue apple”. That is to say, the response probability can 
be used to compare the normality and naturalness between the original text and the adversarial text 
which is artificial. Consequently, the spelling checker can be exploited to determine character-
level perturbations, and the language model can be adapted to detect unnatural word-level 
perturbations. However, all characters in Chinese have individual meanings, which means it is 
much harder to map into the original words by spelling checker; on the other hand, there are lacking 
studies in Chinese and other language’s language model. Furthermore, principally speaking, even 
though a defense model successfully detects the adversarial texts, the defense model still can not 
reflect the same opinion as a real-world reader. For example, a defense model may return an 
attacked error or filter out the malicious file but not predict a sentiment category, while a human 
reader can still read the article and comprehend the writer’s thought. 
Adversarial Training. Adversarial training [11, 22] is a proactive defense strategy that reinforces 
a model by training with infected examples. Unlike normal machine learning models trained in a 
benign environment, adversarial training strengthens the model with an adversarial dataset in the 
training stage and shows the potential protecting performance in reference [12], which has the 
same framework with this paper. However, the high cost and spend of gathering effective and 
sufficient adversarial samples for every attack make difficulty in practically implement adversarial 
training on large-scale problems. Additionally, attackers usually do not share the attacking formula 
and adversarial generating information to the public. It is a real trial to exploit adversarial training 
against unknow and various kinds of attacks from all directions. 
 
C. Limitation and Future Works 
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In this paper, the researcher introduces three attributes of the conditions that the saccade reading 
style will usually be used. To utilize saccade reading and make the most of the concealability at 
the blind spot, perturbations should be modified according to the conditions. For instance, 
replacing with other language characters that are virtually similar to the English alphabet follows 
the Similar Structure and composes readable words that have different Unicode encoding, as 
generally known as homograph attacks [23]; meanwhile, causes out-of-vocabulary and character-
level bugs on NLP learning machines. Also, there are a lot of Chinese characters that are looked 
similar to each other on spatial structure (“土” and ”士”, “日” and “曰”, etc.). It is promising to 
collect a corpus dataset for their spatial features and make the best of Similar Structure attributes 
since the overall performances of Chinese adversarial texts are not as good as English adversarial 
samples. Secondly, this paper studies and demonstrates the strength of saccade-based adversarial 
texts on different state-of-the-art sentiment analysis services. It is an interesting future work to 
show the advantage of robust bugs on other NLP tasks (toxic context detection, fake news detection, 
etc.). Finally, the researcher calls on future work to put more effort into studying adversarial texts 
on other languages, since there are various and numerous information and secret that we can extract 
from textual data on the internet in all kinds of language modernly. 
 
Ⅵ. RELATED WORK 
In this paper, the saccade-based adversarial examples include three kinds of perturbations in both 
character-level attack (Sac and Sub-W-Sac) and word-level attack (Sub-W). This section further 
introduces related works based on different attack granularity.  
Character-level attack. Reference [16], Hotflip, proposing character-level operations, i.e., 
swap, insert and delete, and computing gradient derivatives is one of the pioneers that evaluates 
the adversarial text on white-box testing. Reference [17] proposes iAdv-Text to evaluate the input 
embedding and generate character-level bugs as an optimization problem. Following the idea of 
previous research, the researcher in [8] proposes DeepWordBug and a scoring function to calculate 
the importance of words and merge character-level interferences to successfully attack spam email 
detection systems under a black-box setting. 
Word-level attack. Researchers found out adding particular words in texts will cause artificial 
intelligence models to return sub-optimal and incorrect output. Forward derivatives are used in 
research [18] to evaluate the sensitivity of output in different sentiment analysis benchmark 
datasets. Reference [6] suggests three modification strategies, i.e., insertion, replacement, and 
deletion, to manipulate words with high importance. Reference [19] shows successful results on 
directly perturbing each word on word embeddings and attacking sentiment analysis and text 
classification tasks. However, even using a distance measuring metric, most of the generated 
adversarial texts become unreadable. Since the adversarial examples also confusing human, it 
shows the shortage of perturbation metrics again. 
Sentence-level attack. Reference [20] is one of the inspiring works on studying adversarial 
examples on the textual domain and the first work on attacking reading comprehension models. In 
[20], the researchers add distracting and meaningless sentences at the end of the article and exposes 
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the vulnerability of natural language processing learning machines. Following the concept of 
previous work, reference [21] finds some high gradient phrases of target label, assimilates them 
into valid sentences searched from Wikipedia, and fool text classification model with adversarial 
texts combining the sentences. 
Multi-level attack. The granularity of reference [12], TextBugger, is multi-level. Character-
level attacks, such as insert, delete, swap, and substitute characters, aim to generate perturbations 
that are out-of-vocabulary for target models; on the other hand, word-level attack, such as 
substitute words, intend to find semantically and syntactically similar perturbations that decrease 
the sentiment score of the ground truth or increase the sentiment score of the other labels in targeted 
DNN classification. 
 
Ⅶ. CONCLUSION 
This paper leverages a psychological phenomenon called saccade reading to design generation 
algorithms that naturally hide adversary inputs and attack real-world sentiment analysis learning 
models under a black-box scenario. Moreover, this paper organizes and introduces three attributes 
of conditions that saccade reading been used by human readers. According to the three attributes, 
this paper also proposes a promising way of generating adversarial texts for Chinese data and 
shows the attacking performances. This paper conducts and does user studies to demonstrate the 
advantage and quality of utility preserving for both Chinese and English adversarial texts. Lastly, 
this paper discusses the setting of the platform, potential defenses, and limitations and future works 
from paper’s results. 
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